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I. Introduction 
The insurance forfeiture rule, whereby the fraudulent assured loses the entirety of his claim, has the 
potential to operate in a harsh fashion. Indeed, the courts have recognised (and welcomed) the 
severity of forfeiture for decades1 on the basis that harsh sanctions deter fraud. The problem, however 
is that this notion of deterrence is assumed; there has never been any empirical evidence to 
demonstrate the deterrent effect of the rule2 and, moreover, the operation of the rule is out of step 
with modern thinking about decision making and crime prevention. This paper seeks to demonstrate, 
on the basis of modern deterrence theory, that the forfeiture rule is at best a weak deterrent and 
further, identifies methods by which insurance fraud could be discouraged during the claims process. 
The forfeiture rule is the sole civil sanction for insurance fraud. This means that the rule operates 
irrespective of the size, scale or moral culpability of the particular fraud.3 This is concerning because 
insurance frauds can vary infinitely, from the use of a fraudulent statement to bolster a valid claim4 to 
the deliberate destruction of insured property.5 The current remedial framework is unable to 
                                                          
*Lecturer and PhD Candidate at Cardiff University School of Law and Politics. This represents work undertaken 
as part of my PhD and I would like to express my gratitude to my supervisors, Professor James Davey and David 
Glass, as well as the extremely valuable comments made during this Symposium. I have endeavoured to reflect 
on those comments in this paper where possible in addition to the recent Supreme Court decision in Versloot 
Dredging BV v HDI Gerling Industrie Versicherung (The DC Merwestone) [2016] UKSC 45. As always, any errors 
remain my own. 
1 Versloot Dredging BV v HDI-Gerling Industrie Versicherung AG (The DC Merwestone) [2014] EWCA Civ 1349; 
[2015] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 32 , [75] per Christopher Clarke LJ; Axa General Insurance Ltd v Gottlieb [2005] EWCA Civ 
112; [2005] Lloyd’s Rep. IR 369, [31] per Mance LJ; Britton v Royal Insurance Co (186) 4 F&F 905, 909 per Willes 
J. 
2 This point is also made by P Rawlings and J Lowry, ‘Insurance fraud: The “convoluted and confused” state of 
the law’ [2016] LQR 96, 115: “there is no empirical data to show that the fraudulent claim rule does deter, and 
a growing literature throws serious doubts on the effectiveness of non-criminal (and even criminal) sanctions in 
deterring behaviour.” 
3 For a more detailed explanation of the ways in which these claims differ, see K Richards, ‘Deterring insurance 
fraud: A critical and criminological analysis of the English and Scottish Law Commissions’ current proposals for 
reform’ (2013) 24 ILJ 16. 
4 Agapitos v Agnew (The Aegeon) [2002] EWCA Civ. 247; [2002] Lloyd’s Rep IR 573, The Aegeon (n1) [30] per 
Mance LJ, “A fraudulent device is used if the insured believes that he has suffered the loss claimed, but seeks to 
improve or embellish the facts surrounding the claim, by some lie.” 
5 P Samuel & Co v Dumas (1924) 18 Ll L Rep 211; National Justice Compania v Prudential Assurance Co (The 
Ikarian Reefer) [1995] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 455; The Gold Sky (n46) [1972] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 187. 
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distinguish between frauds, as the criminal law would do,6 since there is only one tool at the courts’ 
disposal. The argument is that a range of nuanced sanctions is required to reflect the range of 
fraudulent claims. This paper begins this process by making a number of recommendations for the 
deterrence of opportunistic claims. These claims require little advance planning and have traditionally 
comprised the exaggerated claim and the use of false evidence to promote an otherwise valid claim. 
These claims are to be distinguished from the wholly fraudulent claims, such as the scuttle, which 
require much greater planning and target significant financial gain. 
An exaggerated claim exists when the assured adds additional items to his insurance claim. The case 
typically cited in the literature concerns exaggeration following a domestic burglary – Galloway v 
Guardian7 – but it is equally possible that exaggeration could take place in the marine setting.8 
Forfeiture has particular bite when it operates in cases of exaggeration. In Galloway, for example, the 
assured lost the genuine portion of his claim – a loss of some £16,000 – due to his fraudulent addition 
of a computer worth £2000. The courts have repeatedly endorsed the severity of forfeiture for reasons 
of deterrence. In Galloway itself, Millett LJ commented,  
The making of dishonest insurance claims has become all too common. There seems to be a 
widespread belief that insurance companies are fair game, and that defrauding them is not 
morally reprehensible. The rule which we are asked to enforce today may appear to some to 
be harsh, but it is in my opinion a necessary and salutary rule which deserves to be better 
known by the public.9 
More recently, the House of Lords confirmed the logic of the forfeiture rule, 
Just as the law will not allow an insured to commit a crime and then use it as a basis for 
recovering an indemnity, so it will not allow an insured who has made a fraudulent claim to 
recover. The logic is simple. The fraudulent insured must not be allowed to think: if the fraud 
is successful, then I will gain; if it is unsuccessful, I will lose nothing.10 
                                                          
6 Fraud Act 2006; Sentencing Council, Fraud, Bribery and Money Laundering Offences: Definitive Guideline 
(October 2014) available at: https://www.sentencingcouncil.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/Fraud_bribery_and_money_laundering_offences_-_Definitive_guideline.pdf (accessed 
22/08/2016). 
7 Galloway v Guardian Royal Exchange (UK) Ltd [1999] Lloyd’s Rep. IR 209. 
8 Glencore Ltd v Alpina Insurance [2003] EWHC 2792 (Comm). 
9 Galloway (n7) 214. 
10 Manifest Shipping Co Ltd v Uni-Polaris Co Ltd (The Star Sea) [2003] 1 AC 469, [62] per Lord Hobhouse. 
3 
 
Until the recent case of Versloot,11 the forfeiture rule was also imposed to sanction assureds who had 
bolstered their genuine loss with a lie.12 This lie could take the form of a forged piece of evidence to 
substantiate a legitimate transaction or exist as a misleading account of events. The Supreme Court 
held that forfeiture was an inappropriate response to collateral lies – “a lie which turns out when the 
facts are found to have no relevance to the insured’s right to recover”13 – and this significantly narrows 
the fraudulent claims jurisdiction. It is important to note, however, that this decision does nothing to 
abrogate the severity of forfeiture for the assured who exaggerates his claim nor sets in motion any 
means by which the legal sanction could be made any more effective as a deterrent. The concerns 
raised in this paper regarding the ineffective nature of forfeiture remain valid notwithstanding this 
recent decision. 
 
II. The Alignment with Rational Choice Theory 
The judicial insistence that harsh sanctions deter fraud mirrors the assertions made by rational choice 
theorists in relation to crime. Rational choice theory is an important part of the toolkit used in an 
economic analysis of law. It seeks to determine what impact law has on behaviour, and whether that 
impact is desirable.14 To do this, an economic analysis makes a number of assumptions about decision 
makers. These are usefully summarised by Gary Becker,  
[A]ll human behavior can be viewed as involving participants who [1] maximize their utility [2] 
from a stable set of preferences and [3] accumulate an optimal amount of information and 
other inputs in a variety of markets.15  
This characterises the process of decision-making as follows: the actor identifies a number of possible 
actions16 and then chooses the course of action which best maximises his utility or self-interest.17 The 
actor conducts a cost-benefit analysis to reach this decision. In the 1950s, the Chicago School adopted 
                                                          
11Versloot Dredging BV v HDI Gerling Industrie Versicherung (The DC Merwestone) [2016] UKSC 45. 
12 The Aegeon (n41). 
13 Versloot (Supreme Court) (n11) [1] per Lord Sumption. 
14 L Kaplow and S Shavell, ‘Economic analysis of law’ (1999) available at: 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/papers/pdf/251.pdf (accessed 01/08/16), 3. 
15 G Becker, An Economic Approach to Human Behavior (University of Chicago Press, 1976) 14. 
16 R Cooter and T Ulen, Law & Economics (3rd ed, Addison-Wesley, 2000), 11. 
17 R Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (5th ed. Aspen Law, 1998), 4. 
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this framework to analyse the law of competition and monopolies, 18 but it was later extended to 
include virtually every area of law. 19 
The application of economic analysis to crime is attributed to the seminal work of Gary Becker.20 He 
contended that the decision to commit crime was no different from any other decision, 21 and so 
should be analysed in the same way. This was an assertion of considerable magnitude given the 
prevailing theories about crime,22 which attributed offending not to the free will of individuals, but to 
their psychological and social deficiencies. Accordingly, the rational criminal weighs the costs of crime 
– the certainty and severity of punishment – against the benefits of crime.23 He refrains from crime 
when those costs outweigh the benefits.24 
The importance of the legal costs in this framework provides opportunities to policymakers, including 
the courts, to construct legal penalties which seek to deter fraud. As Richard Posner has suggested,  
people act as rational maximizers of their satisfactions in making such nonmarket decisions as 
whether to…commit or refrain from committing crimes…Rules of law operate to impose prices 
on…these nonmarket activities, thereby altering the amount or character of the activity…The 
first two premises lead to such predictions as that…increasing the severity as well as certainty 
of criminal punishment will reduce the crime rate.25 
On this basis, an effective deterrent simply requires policymakers to increase the costs of crime, either 
by making detection more likely or the ensuing punishment more severe.26 This is no doubt 
superficially attractive. An unanswered question remained, however: which ‘cost’ should 
                                                          
18 Kaplow and Shavell (n14) 3; E Posner ‘Values and consequences: An introduction to economic analysis of law’ 
in E Posner, Chicago Lectures in Law and Economics (Foundation Press, 2000), 189. 
19 Posner, ‘Values and consequences’ (n18) 189-190; Papers which are attributed with expanding the law & 
economics analysis included R Coase, ‘The problem of social cost’ (1960) 3 J of L and Econ 1 and G Calabresi, 
‘Some thoughts on risk distribution and the law of torts’ (1961) 70 Yale LJ 499. 
20 G Becker, ‘Crime and punishment: An economic approach’ (1968) 76 J of Pol Econ 169, 170 (arguing that the 
framework was applicable to the entire range of criminal offences, including white collar crimes and more trivial 
offences such as parking violations.) 
21 Becker, ‘Crime and punishment’ (n20) 170, 201; N Mazar and D Ariely, ‘Dishonesty in everyday life and its 
policy implications’ (2006) 25(1) J of Pub Pol & Mark. 117, 118. 
22 A comprehensive account of the positive school of criminology is beyond the scope of this work. The following 
provide a representative sample of the causes of crime. R Merton, ‘Social structure and anomie’ (1938) 3(5) Am. 
Soc. Rev. 672, 672, 678; A Quetelet, ‘Of the development of the propensity to crime’ originally published in A 
Quetelet, A Treatise on Man (Chambers, 1842) and reprinted in E McLaughlin, J Muncie and G Hughes (eds), 
Criminological Perspectives (2nd ed. SAGE Publications, 2003),  41; E Ferri, ‘Causes of criminal behaviour’ 
originally published in E Ferri, The Positive School of Criminology; Three Lectures by Enrico Ferri (Charles H Kerr 
& Co., 1908) and partially reprinted in E McLaughlin, J Muncie and G Hughes (n22above) 54. 
23 Becker, ‘Crime and punishment’ (n20) 205. 
24 Ibid 242. 
25 R Posner, ‘The law and economics movement’ (1987) 77 (2) American Economic Review 1, 5. 
26 G Stigler, ‘The optimum enforcement of laws’ in G Becker and W Landes (eds.), Essays in the Economics of 
Crime and Punishment (NBER, 1974), 56. 
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policymakers increase to deter crime? The suggestion made by rational choice theorists was that these 
legal costs were interchangeable and that the answer in every case should depend on considerations 
of efficiency. 
The suggestion that sanction costs are interchangeable and function cumulatively27 is best illustrated 
with an example. For example, a fine of $10,000 with a 0.1 chance of detection has the same expected 
cost to the offender as a fine of $1million where the chance of detection is 0.001.28 In both cases the 
rational offender calculates the expected cost of crime as $1000.29 Provided that this cumulative cost 
exceeds the benefits of offending, the precise contribution of each variable – certainty and severity – 
would seem to matter little. The result of this analysis is that it recognises a very severe but unlikely 
punishment as having exactly the same deterrent effect as a less severe penalty which is more likely 
to be imposed.  
This means that policymakers would need to determine whether to construct sanctions on the basis 
of a high certainty/low severity or low certainty/high severity ratio. The answer for rational choice 
theorists depended on which combination was most efficient.30 The majority of cases, including those 
offences punished by imprisonment or fines, will tend to favour high severity simply because 
increasing detection requires significant, 31 and arguably inefficient, investment in State resources.32 
Since the metric by which the appropriate ratio is determined is efficiency, penalties structured in this 
manner take no account of the particular offence or offender. This means, therefore, that a very 
severe penalty could be constructed for a relatively minor infraction. 
There is a certain symmetry between rational choice theory and the judicial approach to insurance 
fraud. The judges have consistently argued that harsh penalties deter and that communication of 
these penalties will serve to reduce fraud. True, the insurance courts do not speak explicitly in 
economic terms, but this does not preclude the explanatory power of economic theory.33 While 
intuitively attractive, these models are far too simplistic. They fail to recognise the complex realities 
of decision making and the importance of social context for the potential offender. The following 
section of the discussion will highlight some of the ways in which modern deterrence theory 
                                                          
27 Ibid 56; A Harel, ‘Behavioral analysis of criminal law: A survey’ in E Zamir and D Teichman, The Oxford 
Handbook of Behavioral Economics and The Law (OUP, Oxford 2014), 575.  
28 Posner, Economic Analysis (n17) 244. 
29 Ibid 244. 
30 Becker, ‘Crime and punishment’ (n20) 183-184; R Posner, ‘An economic theory of the criminal law’ (1985) 85 
Colum L Rev 1193, 1206. 
31 Becker, ‘Crime and punishment’ (n20) 184; Posner, ‘An economic theory’ (n30) 1206, 1213; Kaplow and 
Shavell, Economic Analysis (n14) [6.2.2]. 
32 Posner, ‘An economic theory’ (n30) 1207. 
33 Ibid 1230 where a similar point is made in relation to the criminal law. 
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undermines many of the foundational aspects of rational choice theory and with it its policy 
recommendations. 
Before moving on, it is important to justify the use of the rational choice approach to criminal decision 
making to critique the civil law response to insurance fraud.34 The simple answer is the different 
purpose for which criminal and civil sanctions are typically employed.35 The civil law typically sanctions 
individuals who harm others in the course of a socially useful activity. 36 The classic example, for our 
purposes, is the contract breaker who must pay damages to his counterpart. Damages are limited to 
the party’s expectation interest since a more punitive award could inhibit contracting activity.37 By 
contrast, the criminal law imposes punishments “for doing what is forbidden”38 and is designed to 
“dissuade the actor from engaging in [the] activity at all.”39 Insurance fraud is devoid of any social 
utility since it results in higher premiums and requires the underwriter to invest (wasted) resources to 
determine the validity of the claim.40 The civil response to fraud – forfeiture – is designed to outlaw 
the submission of fraudulent claims and is not constrained by the considerations that typically affect 
the construction of civil remedies. This resembles the type of conduct proscribed by the criminal law 
and, therefore, by analogy, the economic analysis of the criminal framework provides a much better 
theoretical underpinning of the forfeiture rule than would a similar analysis rooted in the civil law. 
 
III. The Lessons of Modern Deterrence Theory 
Modern deterrence theory is the result of research undertaken to test the assertions of rational choice 
theory41 and developments in decision theory from the behavioural and cognitive sciences. This 
research provides a much richer and more nuanced characterisation of man and the decision-making 
process which he employs. This research significantly undercuts the logic of rational choice theory and 
                                                          
34 I am grateful to Dr Johanna Hjalmarsson for encouraging me to think about the suitability of this framework 
in greater depth and to Professor Rick Swedloff for assisting me in reaching the final conclusion on this point. 
35 A more comprehensive answer is provided in my PhD thesis, ‘Fraud unravels all?’ A critical examination of the 
fraud rules in marine insurance and documentary credits. (Work in progress). 
36 J Coffee, ‘Paradigms lost. The blurring of the criminal and civil law models’ (1991-1992) 101 Yale LJ 1875, 1876; 
R Cooter, ‘Prices and sanctions’ (1984) 84 Colum L Rev 1523, 1525. 
37 Robinson v Harman 154 ER 363 (1848), 365 per Parke B; Cooter, ‘Prices and sanctions’ (n36) 1554; M Bedi, 
‘Contract breaches and the criminal/civil divide: An inter-common law analysis’ (2011-2012) 28 Ga St U L Rev 
559, 583-584, 588-589. This is the fear of ‘over-deterrence’, see generally Posner, ‘An economic theory’ (n30) 
1206. 
38 Cooter, ‘Prices and sanctions’ (n36) 1524. 
39 Coffee (n36) 1876. 
40 Cooter and Ulen (n16) 276 make this point in discussing why fraudulent misrepresentation during negotiations 
will render a contract void. 
41 R Paternoster, ‘How much do we really know about criminal deterrence?’ (2010) 100(3) J of Crim L & Criminol. 
765, 779. 
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sanctions dependent on the framework. The discussion in this section summarises the major lessons 
of deterrence theory in order to consider, in part IV, the construction of more effective deterrents. 
 
a) Certainty and severity not interchangeable 
The rational choice model of crime provides that an individual will refrain from offending when the 
costs of crime exceed the benefits. Deterrence then is simply a matter of constructing legal penalties 
which increase the costs of crime. As discussed in the previous section, the suggestion made by 
rational choice theory was that the contribution of certainty and severity mattered little, provided 
their cumulative weight exceeded the benefits of crime.42 Research undertaken to substantiate these 
assertions instead demonstrated the complexity of the cost-benefit analysis. As a starting point, a 
variety of methods established that certainty of detection was a far greater indicator of deterrence 
than sanction severity.43 In addition, the particular relationship between certainty and severity was 
called into question. The contribution of each variable does in fact matter. The modern research 
demonstrates that both factors must represent a meaningful threat in order that the legal penalty 
constitutes an effective deterrent. If either cost is perceived to be negligible, the threat of legal 
sanctions will not inhibit crime.44 This suggests that policymakers do not have a choice between a high 
certainty/low severity and a low certainty/high severity ratio, but instead must ensure that both 
elements represent a real cost. On the basis that forfeiture is said to derive its deterrent effect from 
severity, this must enable us to draw the conclusion that it is unlikely to be particularly effective in 
discouraging fraudulent claims. 
 
b) The significance of social sanctions 
The rational actor is presumed to weigh only the objective costs of punishment in deciding whether 
to commit a crime. This is problematic for a number of reasons. Firstly, the actor will have very limited 
awareness of the likelihood of detection and punishment and, moreover, will not seek this information 
                                                          
42 Stigler (n26) 56; Harel (n27) 575. 
43 E Blais and J Bacher, 'Situational deterrence and claim padding: Results from a randomized field experiment' 
(2007) 3 J Exp Criminol 337, 338; S Klepper and D Nagin, 'The deterrent effect of perceived certainty and severity 
of punishment revisited' (1989) 27 Criminology 721, 741. 
44 H Grasmick, and D Green, ‘Legal punishment, social disapproval and internalization as inhibitors of illegal 
behavior’ (1980) 71 J of Crim L and Criminol 325, 327. 
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prior to offending.45 In addition, the emphasis on legal penalties ignores the much broader range of 
factors which contribute to decision making.  
These additional variables are generally referred to as social or informal sanctions because they are 
not imposed by the State as a result of wrongdoing.46 Informal sanctions emerge from a number of 
sources, including from the offender himself in the form of feelings of guilt and embarrassment as a 
consequence of contravening his own moral standards.47 Behaviour which disregards society’s 
accepted standards of conduct will also trigger sanctions from the individual’s community. These 
sanctions will harm the individual’s reputation and may result in social exclusion.48 If the wrongdoing 
relates to the individual’s business endeavours, the sanctions may take the form of market costs as 
other market participants become less willing to trade with the individual concerned.49 A further 
category of sanctions should also be mentioned. These are the sanctions which follow the imposition 
of a formal penalty but are not directly imposed by the State50 such as the difficulty of obtaining 
professional employment51 and future insurance cover as a result of a civil finding of fraud. 
The modern research expands the content of the cost-benefit analysis. The individual weighs not only 
the possibility of the legal costs of punishment but also the risk of informal sanctions against the 
benefits of offending. Notably, these informal sanction threats have the capacity to exercise a much 
stronger deterrent effect than formal legal sanctions52 and can do so in a more cost effective manner.53 
It is important to note, however, that informal sanctions do not affect every decision maker in an 
identical fashion, but depend on the extent to which the offender’s community is engaged in 
criminality. If the offender moves in criminal circles, for example, the weight of informal sanctions will 
be considerably lower than those social sanctions levied by a law-abiding group.54 The evidence 
                                                          
45 See later, text to fn 68. 
46 Paternoster (n41) 781. 
47 N Mazar, O Amir and D Ariely, ‘The dishonesty of honest people: A theory of self-concept maintenance’ (2008) 
45(6) J of Mark. R 633, 633 – 634. 
48 L Bernstein, ‘Opting out of the legal system: Extra-legal contractual relations in the diamond industry’ (1992) 
21 JLS 115, 138-140; L Bernstein, ‘Private commercial law in the cotton industry: Creating cooperation through 
rules, norms, and institutions’ (2000-2001) 99 Mich L Rev 1724, 1748-1750. 
49 A Ogus, Costs and Cautionary Tales (Hart Publishing, 2006), 130. 
50 The author is grateful to Professor Rick Swedloff for highlighting this distinction in discussions at the Insurance 
Fraud Symposium (University of Southampton Law School, 13 July 2016). 
51 J Waldfogel, ‘The effect of criminal conviction on income and the trust “reposed in the workmen”’ (1994) J 
Hum Resour 62, 63, 66, 72. 
52 S Klepper and D Nagin, 'The deterrent effect of perceived certainty and severity of punishment revisited' 
(1989) 27 Criminology 721, 721; D Kahan ‘Social influence, social meaning, and deterrence’ (1997) 83(2) Va L Rev 
349, 354, 357. 
53 K Dau-Schmidt, ‘An economic analysis of the criminal law as a preference-shaping policy’ (1990) 1 Duke LJ 1, 
30. 
54 Grasmick and Green (n44) 329; 54 P Robinson and J Darley, ‘Does criminal law deter? A behavioral science 
investigation’ (2004) 24(2) Oxford J of Leg Stud 173, 192. See also, Kahan ‘Social influence’ (n52) 357. 
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suggests, however, that the majority of people are honest and this is attributed to the reputational 
and personal costs associated with lying.55 This provides some explanation for the relative strength of 
informal sanctions and suggests that policies which trigger these ‘costs’ are likely to be effective.56  
The relative strength of social sanctions should not be confused with an argument that legal sanctions 
are wholly ineffective. This is not the case. In many ways, informal sanctions are dependent on formal 
sanctions.57 For example, an offender’s community will only be able to impose informal sanctions 
when they are aware that he has contravened accepted standards of conduct.58 The imposition of a 
formal sanction, be it an arrest or the forfeiture of an insurance claim, signals this transgression to the 
broader community. In addition, where the legal framework coincides with society’s views about a 
certain offence, formal sanctions serve to confirm the validity of social views and exerts a moralising 
effect.59 The evidence suggests that where the law is regarded as credible, as in circumstances where 
an alignment between law and social values exists, there is likely to be greater obedience to the 
particular law.60  
 
c) Limited rationality and heuristics 
The headline of modern deterrence theory is that decision making is far more complex than asserted 
by rational choice theory. This complexity means that individuals cannot weigh all possible 
alternatives61 or compute the infinitely vast quantities of information needed to make a wholly 
rational decision.62 Instead, individuals adopt mental rules of thumb, known as heuristics, and rely on 
biases to reach decisions.63 The problem, however, is that these heuristics are apt to mislead and may 
cause an individual to favour offending in contrast to the predictions of the rational model. The 
                                                          
55 J Abeler, D Nosenzo and C Raymond, ‘Preferences for truth-telling’ (IZA Discussion Paper No. 10188, 
September 2016) available at: http://ftp.iza.org/dp10188.pdf (accessed 15/09/2016), 38-39. 
56 Ibid 38-39. 
57 Klepper and Nagin (n52) 741; Ogus (n49) 130. 
58  Collins (n65) (missingH Collins, Regulating Contracts (OUP, 1999)) 124. Of course, there are some 
circumstances in which social sanctions will be levied irrespective of formal sanctions. This will be the case where 
the individual feels guilty because he has crossed a moral line of where misconduct is visible to other market 
participants. 
59 R Paternoster and S Simpson, 'Sanction threats and appeals to morality: Testing a rational choice model of 
corporate crime' (1996) 30 L & Soc Rev 549, 577; J Kidwell, ‘A caveat’ (1985) Wis L Rev 615, Kidwell (missing) 
(n80) 618. 
60 D Kahan, ‘Between economics and sociology: The new path of deterrence’ (1996-1997) 95 Mich L Rev 2477, 
2481; P Robinson, ‘The criminal-civil distinction and the utility of desert’ (1996) 76 Boston Uni. L Rev. 201, 213; 
from E Zamir and B Medina, Law, Economics, and Morality (OUP, 2010), 77-78. 
61 R Korobkin and T Ulen, ‘Law and behavioral science: Removing the rationality assumption from law and 
economics’ [2000] 88(4) Cal L Rev. 1051, 1077. 
62 C Jolls, C Sunstein and R Thaler, ‘A behavioral approach to law and economics’ [1998] 50 Stan LR 1471, 1477. 
63 Ibid 1477. 
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research has identified many heuristics which impact the decision-making process and the discussion 
here focuses on those most relevant for deterrence. 
 
 The availability heuristic 
Rational choice assumes that individuals know the objective likelihood of detection and punishment 
when making decisions about crime. This is unlikely,64 not least because of the many variables 
affecting detection and the role judicial discretion plays in sentencing.65 ABI statistics on insurance 
fraud demonstrated that a majority of respondents surveyed considered that fraudsters were 
‘unlikely’ or ‘very unlikely’ to be detected.66 This is despite concerted industry efforts to counter this 
perception.67 
Moreover, the evidence demonstrates that potential offenders do not attempt to gather objective 
information before offending68 but instead rely on the availability heuristic. This is a means of 
assessing the likelihood of a particular event by reference to the ease with which the actor can call to 
mind similar examples.69 Evidently, the individual’s personal experiences, those of his community and 
relevant media coverage will dramatically affect his perception of that particular event.70 Availability 
is not a particularly reliable indicator, however, since “actors are…systematically insensitive to sample 
size and therefore erroneously take small samples as representative.”71 In the context of insurance 
fraud, this means that an assured who has successfully exaggerated a previous claim is likely to 
underestimate the risk of detection. 
                                                          
64 T Brooks, Punishment (Routledge Cavendish, Oxford 2012), 47; N Mazar and D Ariely, ‘Dishonesty in everyday 
life and its policy implications’ (2006) 25(1) J of Pub Pol & Mark. 117, 120. 
65 Robinson and Darley (n54) 177; T Tyler, Why People Obey The Law (Yale University Press, 1990) 177. 
66 ABI, Research Brief: Deterring Opportunistic General Insurance Fraud (2010) available at: 
http://www.betterregulation.com/external/Research%20Brief%20Deterring%20opportunistic%20general%20i
nsurance%20fraud.pdf (accessed 30/07/16), 6: 51% thought it was ‘unlikely’ or ‘very unlikely’ that insurance 
frauds would be detected. 
67 ABI, ‘Insurers will do whatever it takes to protect honest customers against insurance fraud’ (18/01/16) 
available at: https://www.abi.org.uk/News/News-updates/2016/01/Insurers-will-do-whatever-it-takes-to-
protect-honest-customers-against-insurance-fraud (accessed 13/08/16). 
68 Robinson and Darley (n54) 174-176. 
69 A Tversky and D Kahneman, 'Availability: A heuristic for judging frequency and probability' (1973) 5 Cognitive 
Psychology 207, 208 “Life-long experience has taught us that instances of large classes are recalled better and 
faster than instances of less frequent classes, that likely occurrences are easier to imagine than unlikely ones, 
and that associative connections are strengthened when two events frequently co-occur. Thus, a person could 
estimate the numerosity of a class, the likelihood of an event, or the frequency of co-occurrences by assessing 
the ease with which the relevant mental operation of retrieval, construction, or association can be carried out.” 
70 Robinson and Darley (n54) 177-178. 
71 M Eisenberg, ‘Behavioral economics and contract law’ in E Zamir and D Teichman (eds.), The Oxford Handbook 
of Behavioral Economics and the Law (OUP, 2014) 447. 
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The perceived likelihood of detection and punishment is tied to the availability heuristic. After all, if 
individuals do not gather objective information before offending, perception is the only basis for 
decision making.72 Perception, much like availability, is affected by the actor’s experience and those 
of his community.73 In addition, however, an individual’s decision to comply with the law will also 
depend on his perception of “others’ behaviour and attitude toward the law.”74 This suggests that 
changing the law is not enough; policymakers must seek to increase perceptions about the likelihood 
of punishment in a manner that is capable of influencing decision makers at the relevant stage in the 
claims process.75 
 
 Hyperbolic discounting 
The recognition that social sanctions are significant in decision-making changes the nature of the 
model. In addition, the modern research also demonstrates that decision makers do not weigh the 
relevant factors in the way suggested by rational choice theory. Instead of according each factor an 
equal weight,76 decision makers prioritise the immediate and marginalise the distant.77 This is the 
heuristic of hyperbolic discounting. Its presence in the decision-making process is a useful explanation 
of short-term decisions which conflict with the individual’s self-professed long-term goals.78 
Hyperbolic discounting is particularly significant in offender decision making. Crime will very often 
result in immediate (financial) benefits79 with punishment postponed until investigative and legal 
processes have been concluded.80 This lag is particularly stark in relation to fraud; victims may not 
immediately recognise that they have been targeted and lengthy investigations are often needed to 
substantiate allegations of fraud.81 In short, the effect of hyperbolic discounting is to skew the cost-
                                                          
72 Paternoster (n41) 780; Robinson and Darley (n54) 184. 
73 Robinson and Darley (n54) 177, 178. 
74 Kahan, ‘Social influence’ (n52) 354. 
75 Ibid 361. 
76 See Zamir and Medina (n60) 86 who suggest that certain factors necessarily have ‘lexical priority’ over others 
but that these different weightings are ignored by a conventional cost-benefit analysis. 
77 T Ulen and R McAdams, ‘Behavioral criminal law and economics’ (2008) University of Chicago Public Law and 
Legal Theory Working Paper No. 244, 23; Robinson and Darley (n92n54) 194; Jolls, Sunstein and Thaler (n62) 
1539. 
78 Jolls, Sunstein and Thaler (n62) 1480. 
79 Robinson and Darley (n54) 195. 
80 T Loughran, R Paternoster and D Weiss, ‘Hyperbolic time discounting, offender time preferences and 
deterrence’ (2012) 28 J Quant Criminol 607, 608. 
81 R Ogren, 'The ineffectiveness of the criminal sanction in fraud and corruption cases: Losing the battle against 
white collar crime' (1972-1973) 11 Am Crim L Rev 959, 969. Recent investments in the criminal process, most 
notably the creation of the Insurance Fraud Enforcement Department (IFED), seeks to expedite the process, see 
https://www.cityoflondon.police.uk/advice-and-support/fraud-and-economic-crime/ifed/pages/default.aspx  
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benefit analysis in favour of offending even in circumstances where the likelihood and severity of 
punishment are objectively high. 
 
 The optimism bias 
If decision makers are naturally programmed to discount potential punishments, by virtue of 
hyperbolic discounting, the optimism bias exacerbates this tendency. Optimism, on the one hand, 
leads individuals to believe that negative consequences are more likely to happen to others82 and, on 
the other, increases the perception of benefits which result from crime. In combination, this may tip 
the balance in favour of offending. Of course, this propensity to optimism may cause the offender to 
take fewer precautions to avoid detection.83 As McAdams and Ulen have noted, this “would bolster 
the true probability of detection, which partially offsets the dilution of deterrence excess optimism 
causes.”84 It is important to recognise, however, that while fewer precautions can be easily envisaged 
in relation to street offences, it is not as easy to translate this to the commercial fraud context. This 
underlines the need for additional empirical work to consider the impact of behavioural heuristics in 
the commercial (fraud) context. 
The discussion in this part has highlighted that decision-making about crime diverges from the rational 
choice model in a significant number of ways. The reasons for this are usefully summarised by 
Robinson and Darley, 
Potential offenders commonly do not know the legal rules …Even if they know the rules, the 
cost-benefit analysis potential offenders perceive … commonly leads to … violation rather 
than compliance, either because the perceived likelihood of punishment is so small, or 
because it is so distant as to be highly discounted … And, even if they know the legal rules and 
perceive a cost-benefit analysis that urges compliance, potential offenders commonly cannot 
or will not bring such knowledge to bear [because of] a variety of social, situational or chemical 
influences. Even if no one of these three hurdles is fatal to the law’s behavioural influence, 
their cumulative effect typically is.85 
                                                          
82 Jolls, Sunstein and Thaler (n62) 1524; C Jolls, ‘Behavioral economics analysis of redistributive legal rules’ (1998) 
51 Vand L Rev 1653, 1659. 
83 Ulen and McAdams (n77) 17. 
84 Ibid 17 citing N Garoupa, ‘Behavioral economic analysis of crime: A critical review’ (2003) 15 European J of 
Law and Economics 5, 9. 
85 Robinson and Darley (n54) 174. 
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If the account of decision-making is inaccurate, the policy prescriptions made by rational choice 
theorists must be equally erroneous. On this basis, it is difficult to accept the judicial account of the 
forfeiture rule, namely that its severity deters fraud. This must change the nature of the debate. The 
onus is on academics and policymakers to construct deterrents which conform to the lessons of 
modern deterrence theory and subject those tools to rigorous testing. This is no small task. The 
remainder of this paper builds on existing work and briefly considers how these lessons could be 
operationalised in the insurance claims context.  
 
IV. Developing Modern Deterrents 
The suggestion that modern deterrence theory provides a more solid foundation for policy making 
should lead us to different recommendations about deterrence. Effective deterrents should seek to 
override the heuristics which cause individuals to offend and seek to harness the power of social 
sanctions to curb wrongdoing. Examples drawn from recent empirical work and industry initiatives 
demonstrate how the insurance claims process can be remodelled in light of the lessons from modern 
deterrence theory. 
The design of the claim form is critical. Blais and Bacher’s randomised control trial of the claims process 
across four insurance companies demonstrates how social sanctions can be employed to reduce the 
extent of exaggeration.86 In half of the claims, the policyholder received a letter in addition to the 
standard claim form. The letter reminded recipients of the penalties for fraud and continued, 
[a]nd we know, as a recent poll has revealed, that a very large majority of people feel that 
boosting insurance claims is morally wrong…we very well know that the large majority of 
insurance holders share our beliefs. And this is why we take this opportunity to ask for your 
help and your cooperation in completing carefully the enclosed forms.87 
On average, policyholders in receipt of this experimental letter submitted claims worth $300 less than 
claimants who were processed according to the company’s standard procedure.88 This intervention 
can be viewed as an attempt to overcome some of the biases that result in the decision to commit 
fraud. Firstly, reminding recipients of the legal penalties may counter the effect of hyperbolic 
                                                          
86 E Blais and J Bacher, 'Situational deterrence and claim padding: Results from a randomized field experiment' 
(2007) 3 J Exp Criminol 337. 
87 Ibid 350. 
88 Ibid 344, 347. 
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discounting by emphasising sanctions at the precise time of decision making. The appeal to morality 
can also be understood as reifying the social sanctions which serve to deter the individual.  
The location of the honesty declaration is also of critical importance. The majority of claims forms 
require the assured to confirm by signature that the contents of the form are accurate. Research by 
Shu et al. suggests that this declaration comes too late; by the time the assured signs the form, the 
exaggeration has already occurred.89 Their research suggests that the relocation of this declaration to 
the top of the form can reduce the amount of fraud.90 The reduction in fraud is equated with the 
process of swearing an oath in court; 91 the individual is reminded of the importance of honesty at the 
very moment that the opportunity for dishonesty is presented. 92 
Recent industry initiatives to counter fraud can also be analysed from the perspective of modern 
deterrence theory. The Insurance Fraud Enforcement Department (IFED), funded by insurers, was 
established in 2012 and centralised investigation and expertise in financial crimes. To date, IFED’s 
work has resulted in the confiscation of £1.3million from fraudsters and 200 convictions totalling more 
than 100 years in prison sentences.93 This is an important step forward in the criminal response to 
insurance fraud.94 Most notably for our purposes, the work of IFED has been publicised through a BBC 
1 daytime television show, ‘Claimed and Shamed’, now in its sixth series.95 If, as the evidence 
suggests,96 individuals perceive that they are unlikely to be caught, media coverage should increase 
the ease with which they can call to mind instances of detection and punishment. This overcomes the 
impact of the availability heuristic which may cause individuals to choose to offend. Furthermore, the 
television coverage treats insurance fraud in the same way as ‘street crimes’ are typically portrayed 
in the media. This may help to alter the perception that insurance fraud is not morally wrong and that 
it is victimless.97 
                                                          
89 L Shu et al, ‘Signing at the beginning makes ethics salient and decreases dishonest self-reports in comparison 
to signing at the end.’ (2012) 109(38) PNAS 15197, 15198.  
90 Ibid 15197-15198. 
91 Ibid 15197. 
92 Ibid 15198. See also N Mazar, O Amir and D Ariely, ‘(Dis)Honesty: A combination of internal and external 
rewards’ (Working Paper, Sloan School of Management (MIT)) cited in D Ariely, The (Honest) Truth About 
Dishonesty (Harper, 2012), 50-51. 
93 IFED, ‘IFED News’ (22/01/16) available at: https://www.cityoflondon.police.uk/advice-and-support/fraud-
and-economic-crime/ifed/ifed-news/Pages/Insurance-Fraud-Enforcement-Department-announce-new-
head.aspx (accessed 31/07/16). 
94 Insurance Fraud Taskforce, Insurance Fraud Taskforce Final Report (2016), [2.7].Law Com (reference missing) 
95 BBC, ‘Claimed and Shamed’ available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b071hmq0 (accessed 01/08/16). 
96 ABI, ‘Deterring general opportunistic insurance fraud’ (n66) 6. 
97 S Viaene and G Dedene, ‘Insurance fraud: Issues and challenges’ (2004) 29(2) The Geneva Papers on Risk and 
Insurance, 321.  
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Granted, the redesign of the claim form is not particularly innovative but these administrative tweaks 
have the capacity to deter fraud at the relevant time and are underpinned by empirical support. 
Moreover, these suggestions are relatively cheap98 and could be undertaken at the same time as 
insurers rewrite their policy documentation in light of recent legislation.99 More broadly, the work of 
the industry goes to show that the legal remedy should only be one part of the response to fraud. 
Prevention – in the form of behavioural triggers in the claim form and elsewhere – must surely be 
better than cure. 
 
V. Conclusion 
The judicial assertion that the forfeiture rule deters depends on an outdated understanding of 
decision-making. Accordingly, the policy recommendations made on the strength of rational choice 
theory are likely to be ineffective in deterring crime, and insurance fraud specifically. The argument 
made here was that modern deterrence provides a much more realistic and empirically robust model 
for developing deterrents. In particular, modern deterrents should seek to override cognitive biases 
which currently lead to decisions to offend and trigger social sanctions. These arguments were not 
well received by the Supreme Court in Versloot.100 In argument, Lord Mance captured the entirety of 
this discussion, noting the existence of “theories of judicial activity [which] invite us to operate on the 
basis of rational choice theory which assume that people behave logically and that we have knowledge 
of the law.”101 The judicial response to the behavioural evidence is disappointing, if not wholly 
surprising. Indeed, it reflects the fact that the judiciary is inculcated in a particular model of law-
making and are generally unable to take account of the social consequences of judicial decisions.102 
This decision does not signal the end for a more nuanced remedial response. In particular, the 
Insurance Fraud Taskforce has recognised the potential for behaviourally-informed deterrents to 
counter opportunistic fraud.103 This is promising. Until then, academics and policymakers alike must 
                                                          
98 Shu et al. (n89) 15198. 
99 Insurance Act 2015; Consumer Insurance (Disclosure and Representations) Act 2012. 
100 Versloot (Supreme Court) (n11) [10] per Lord Sumption: “These points have some force. But I doubt whether 
they are relevant. Courts are rarely in a position to assess empirically the wider behavioural consequences of 
legal rules. The formation of legal policy in this as in other areas depends mainly on the vindication of collective 
moral values and on judicial instincts about the motivation of rational beings, not on the scientific anthropology 
of fraud or underwriting.”, [124] per Lord Mance. 
101 Versloot Dredging BV v HDI Gerling Industrie Versicherung (The DC Merwestone) (Hearing on 16/03/16, 
morning session), 2h 12 per Lord Mance available at: https://www.supremecourt.uk/watch/uksc-2014-
0252/160316-am.html (accessed 31/07/16). 
102 Versloot (Supreme Court) (n11) [10] per Lord Sumption.  
103 Insurance Fraud Taskforce, Insurance Fraud Taskforce Final Report (2016) available at:  
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/insurance-fraud-taskforce-final-report (accessed 13/09/2016), 
[3.47]. 
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resist the temptation of lawmaking on the basis of simplistic, untested policy assertions. It is only then 
that a legal sanction may have some traction in the deterrence of fraudulent claims. 
 
 
